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TRIALS-QUESTION OF RES JUDICATA
Defendant police officers, in a departmental hearing,1 were acquitted
of charges of accepting bribes when the principal witness refused to
testify. At a second hearing, four months later, petitioners were found
guilty as charged on the basis of that witness' testimony. As a result of
the later decision, defendants were removed from the police force. On
appeal defendants allege that the first decision was res judicata. Held, no
strictly binding legal rule of estoppel should apply to administrative
decisions, particularly where such application would preclude a decision
on the merits. Evans v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 382, 123 N.Y.S.2d 662
(1st Dep't 1953).
It is a general rule that the decision of an administrative board
or officer acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity under the proper
empowering statute has the same binding effect as the judgment of a
properly-constituted court? The courts agree that the ministerial or
administrative decisions of a board or officer have no strict judicial
finality." The principal difficulty arises when the courts attempt to
characterize the functions of a particular board or officer as administrative
or judicial for the purposes of res judicata. 4  This tenuous classification
often has most confusing results. 5
The application of res judicata in administrative law is further
1. Before a deputy appointed by the police commissioner, as authorized by
N. Y. City Charter § 434; ADM. CODE § 434a-14.0.
2. 2 FREEMAN ON JUDCEMENTS § 633 (5th ed. 1925) and cases there cited.
3. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Wong
Gum v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 114 (N.D. Cal. 1953); In re Whitford's Liquor
License, 166 Pa. Super. 48, 70 A.2d 708 (1950); Cantlay & Tanzola, Inc. v. Public
Service Comm., 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1951).
While the rules that govern the finality and conclusiveness of adjudications
at the common law do not apply, in the strict sense, to administrative . . .
action in the Executive Departments of Government, yet in administrative
action, as well as in judicial proceeding, it is both expedient and necessary that
there should be an end of controversy. In re Barratt's Appeal, 14 App. 1. C.
255, 257 (1899).
4. See Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 5
Wis. L. REV. 37-42 (1942) for a detailed discussion of this tendency.
5. Compare three of Mr. Justice Holmes' decisions: In re Janvrin, 174 Mass.
514, 55 N.E. 381 (1899) (rate-making is a judicial functionl; Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (railroad rate-making predominantly legislative);
Springer v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 210 (1928) (His dissenting
opinion says: ". . . The Interstate Commerce Commission does legislative, judicial,
and executive acts, softened only by a quasi . .. we do not and cannot carry out
the distinction . . . with mathematical precision .... " (Citations arranged
chronologically to show the policy development.)
CASENOTES
complicated by the doctrine's traditional judicial problems of jurisdiction,
privity,7 and the necessity for a final8 decision on the merits.9 No detailed
discussion of the complexities of the situation can be attempted here.10
It must suffice to say that interpretation of the empowering statute11
and protection of the public interest 12 are generally the best guides to
the probable rcs judicata effect of an administrative decision.
More specifically, the removal of members of a police force is generally
regarded as judicial or quasi-judicial if removal is for cause or is exercised
after a hearing.13 However, where the pertinent statute or chartcr permits
summary discharge, the action may be considered administrative. 14
There are cases which suggest that bearings concerning the dismissal ot
public employees have res judicata effect' 5 but ". . . the vein of authority
runs very thin."'16 Indeed, what appears the most logical approach to
this particular problem is found in Handlon v. Town of Belleville" which
held that the civil service commission could re-examine its dismissal of a
court clerk.' 8
6. Anderson Lumber & Supply Co. v. Fletcher, 228 Ind. 383, 89 N.E.2d 449
(1950); Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 32 N.W.2d 574 (1948);
Shires v. Reynolds, 208 Okla. 287, 255 P.2d 491 (1953).
7. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (decision
by Bituminous Coal Commission binding on coal company in later case between
company and Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
8. Hastings Mfg. Co. v. FT7C, 153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
853 (1946) (dismissal "without prejudice" not final decision); C.G. Con, Ltd. v.
NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939) (dismissal with reservation of jurisdiction has
no finality).
9. Oravec v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 171 Pa. Super. 491,
90 A.2d 269 (1952).
10. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 566 (1951).
Whenever the traditional rules of res judicata do not work well as applied
to particular administrative action, those rules may be weakened in any desired
degree without destroying the essential service of the doctrine ....
This escape from the all-or-none fallacy is fully supported in the
practices of the agencies and in the holdings of the courts, although the
proposition that res judicata may be a matter of degree is not articulated
as such ....
11. Katz v. Sims, 25 N.J. Misc. 415, 54 A.2d 483 (C.P. 1947); City of Socorro
v. Cook, 24 N.M. 202, 173 Pac. 682 (1918); Padian v. McAdoo, 114 App. Div. 100,
99 N.Y. Supp. 600 (Ist Dep't 1906).
12. Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (F.C.C. should
re-examine each application for renewal of an old license and grant or refuse it in
the public interest).
13. Swatn v. Council of City of Vellejo, 33 Cal. App.2d 867, 206 P.2d 355 (1949);
Borough of Jamesburg v. Hubbs, 6 N.J. 578, 80 A.2d 100 (1951); Reger v. Mulrooney,
241 App. Div. 38, 271 N.Y. Supp. 20 (1st Dep't 1934); White v. Bolmer, 223
S.W.2d 686 (Tea. 1949).
14. Barton v. Baillies, 157 Fla. 492, 26 So.2d 449 (1946); Sirmans v. Owen,
87 Fla. 485, 100 So. 734 (1924); City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 24
So.2d 319 (1946).
15. Lillienthal v. City of Wyandotte, 286 Mich. 604, 282 N.W. 837 (1938);
McAlpine v. City of Garfield, 25 N.J. Misc. 477, 55 A.2d 666 (1947); Stowell v.
Santoro, 256 App. Div. 934, 9 N.Y.S.2d 866 (2nd Dep't 1939) (cited in instant case
at pp. 667, 671).
16. Evans v. Monaghan, 123 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (1st Dep't 1953).
17. 4 N.J. 99, 71 A.2d 624 (1950).
18. In analogy to the authority of courts of general jurisdiction at common
law, administrative tribunals possess the inherent power of reconsideration
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The dissenting opinion in the instant case relies heavily on the decision
in Stowell v. Santoro'9 which prevented village trustees from convicting
the petitioner (police chief) of a bribery charge after a previous acquittal
on the same specification. r1ie dissenters are fearful that a grant of retrial
power to the police department could result in endless vexation for members
of the force. The majority of the court makes a weak attempt to
distinguish the facts of the Stowell case but is primarily concerned with
the necessity for a decision on the merits. Since whatever evidence was
offered at the first hearing was directed to the guilt or innocence of the
accused, it is difficult to support this emphasis.
However, since a court of law will relax the res judicata doctrine
to further the ends of justice,20 administrative agencies, with their greater
flexibility,' should have the same power. Even in a criminal case, the
refusal of a witness to testify may result in a mistrial so that the defendant
can be retried.22  Removal proceedings are not criminal actions,23 although
they are penal in nature, 24 and it appears illogical to extend to defendants
in a departmental trial greater protection from jeopardy than a criminal
proceeding might afford them. It is further suggested that ". . . in
proceedings for the removal or discharge of a policeman the protection
of the public is a matter of paramount importance, exceeding perhaps
the individual interests of the policeman concerned."-"
Fred Patrox
CONFLICT OF LAWS-IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
OVER NON-RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS-
DOING BUSINESS TEST
Defendants, out of state owners of a Florida orange grove, listed the
grove for sale with a real estate broker in Florida. In a suit for the broker's
of their judicial acts, except as cualified by statute. This function arises by
necessary implication to serve the statutory policy . . .. The denial to
such tribunals of the authority to correct error and injustice and to revise
its judgments for good and sufficient cause would run counter to the public
interest . . . . The power of correction and revision, the better to serve
the statutory policy., is of the very nature of such governmental agencies.(Italics supplied.)
19. 256 App. Div. 934, 9 N.Y.S.2d 866 (2nd Dep't 1939).
20. Universal Const. Co. v. Ft. Lauderdale, 68 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1953).
21. See note 10 supra.
22. United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, No. 14,858 (C. C. D. Mass.
1815).
23. Sullivan v. Mun. Ct. of Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566, 78 N.E.2d 618 (1948);
McGillicuddy v. Monaghan, 201 Misc. 650, 112 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.) aff d on
other grounds, 280 App. Div. 144, 112 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1st Dept 1952).
24. Fort Wayne v. Bishop, 228 Ind. 304, 92 N.E.2d 544 (1950).
25. City of Gary v. Yaksich, 120 Ind. App. 121, 127, 90 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1950).
